ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ЭФФЕКТА ФИНАНСОВОГО ЗАРАЖЕНИЯ В ЕВРОЗОНЕ В ПЕРИОД ДОЛГОВОГО КРИЗИСА by V. Rasskazov E. & В. Рассказов Е.
99
ФИНАНСЫ, ДЕНЕЖНОЕ ОБРАЩЕНИЕ И КРЕДИТ
УДК 330.101.54
ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ  ЭФФЕКТА ФИНАНСОВОГО 
ЗАРАЖЕНИЯ  В ЕВРОЗОНЕ 
В ПЕРИОД  ДОЛГОВОГО КРИЗИСА
РАССКАЗОВ ВЛАДИСЛАВ ЕВГЕНЬЕВИЧ*,
студент Бизнес-школы Ньюкасла при Университете Нортамбрия, Ньюкасл, Великобритания
E-mail: rasskazov.vladislav@gmail.com 
АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье рассматривается изменение эффекта финансового заражения (ситуация, когда в периоды кризисов 
страны, экономически слабо связанные между собой в стабильные периоды, демонстрируют однонаправлен-
ное движение макропоказателей, поскольку кризис в одной из них провоцирует кризис в другой) в Еврозоне 
в период европейского долгового кризиса. За время кризиса институциональные связи на межбанковском 
уровне ослабли, а на государственно-банковском уровне несколько окрепли, что характеризует изменение 
природы финансового заражения. Риск дефолта отдельного банка стал менее опасен для финансовой систе-
мы, однако зависимость банков от устойчивости государства возросла. Сила изменений связи между риском 
государственного дефолта и изменением финансового заражения отличается по кластерам, сформированным 
по вероятности риска государственного дефолта. Регрессионное уравнение CDS создано специально для це-
лей исследования, а именно получения остатков индивидуальных моделей банков. В работе используются два 
подхода к анализу финансового заражения, регрессионный и корреляционный анализ.
Ключевые слова: системный риск; финансовое заражение; европейский долговой кризис; модель CDS; регрес-
сионный анализ; корреляционный анализ.
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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to study changes in the effect of fi nancial contagion in the Eurozone during the European Debt 
Crisis. The results of the study show that the strength of institutional connections on the interbank level had 
decreased, while on the sovereign-bank level it had weakened; which could be explained by the change of the 
nature of the fi nancial contagion with the fl ow of the crisis. Default risk of an individual bank had become less 
dangerous for the fi nancial system; however, the dependence of banks on the sovereign stability had increased. 
An association of sovereign default risk and changes in the fi nancial contagion varies among clusters, subject 
to the sovereign default risk probability. A regression equation of CDS spread was composed for the purpose 
of analysis of individual regression models’ residuals. Two approaches of analysis were applied in the research: 
regression and correlation analysis.
Keywords: systemic risk; fi nancial contagion; bank risk; European Debt Crisis; CDS modelling; residuals analysis; 
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Severe consequences of sovereign defaults during the European Debt Crisis have re-newed concerns on the connectivity of coun-
tries in the global financial system. The crisis has 
shown that systemic risk is underestimated and 
requires careful reviewing, as systemic risk is not 
just a composition of individual types of risk, but 
a whole new level of risk. The main challenge as-
sociated with systemic risk regulation is that it 
cannot be directly attributed to a certain financial 
institution, because systemic risk arises from the 
interaction of direct risks (credit, liquidity, opera-
tional, etc.) and, thus, presents a higher form of 
risk, which evolves simultaneously with market 
developments.
The main mechanism of systemic risk transi-
tion is financial contagion. The derivative nature 
of contagion complicates its measurement and 
regulation, because relations to the underlying 
sources of risk cannot be directly tracked. It fol-
lows that contagion cannot be captured through a 
single model and it can be accessed only through 
the analysis of discrepancies between fundamen-
tal and real life results. Therefore, contagion 
may be approached as a distortion of normal con-
ditions.
The subject of systemic risk is relevant for any 
country, because financial contagion is an inher-
ent part of any financial system. The current Rus-
sian recession, caused by the structural vulnera-
bility of the economy, has spread free through the 
financial system, causing a wide-scale closure of 
banks. Thus, it may be deduced, that measures of 
the Central Bank of Russia have direct influence 
on the banking sector through various channels of 
contagion.
Despite the significance of the contagion risk 
effect, our knowledge of its mechanism is still 
limited. A range of approaches have been devel-
oped in recent years; however, none of them can 
provide a single comprehensive answer to the 
question of contagion risk measurement. Thus, 
further research of its nature is required.
The limited information on the Russian banks 
and lack of market products, such as credit de-
fault swaps, constrains the research of the effect 
in Russia. In this regard, the most appropriate ap-
proach is an analogy. The study of the European 
Debt Crisis and its impact on the contagion effect 
could clarify consistencies of financial contagion.
SYSTEMIC RISK 
AND FINANCIAL CONTAGION
Across financial literature, there exist a wide 
range of systemic risk defi nitions in which authors 
focus on some of the following features: sudden 
occurrence, disturbance of fi nancial system func-
tions, signifi cant scale, probability of occurrence, 
evolving nature of the phenomenon, contagion, 
interconnectedness between fi nancial system ele-
ments, insolvency of fi nancial institutions, impact 
on the real economy and loss of confi dence [1, 11].
Kaufman and Scott [7] provide the following defi -
nition:
“Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of 
breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to break-
downs in individual parts or components, and is evi-
denced by comovements (correlation) among most or 
all the parts”.
Most defi nitions emphasize a feature of systemic 
risk which signifi es that a certain unexpected event 
can potentially collapse the entire system. Triggers of 
the systemic risk may be seen as black swan events, 
which can be characterized as events beyond normal 
expectations, with a non-computable probability of 
occurrence and associated with corresponding psy-
chological biases. It follows, that as these events can-
not be predicted, fi nancial institutions should build 
overall robustness against negative events, decreas-
ing contagion.
The process of systemic risk functioning may be 
schematised in the following way:
It starts with a shock, which spreads through the 
channels of contagion affecting one or multiple insti-
tutions (Figure 1). When the shock affects a fi nancial 
institution it deteriorates its fi nancial viability. The 
partial failure or default of the fi nancial institution be-
comes a source for the second round of shocks. Thus, 
the mechanism, which materialises systemic risk, is 
fi nancial contagion.
Financial contagion refers to a situation in which 
instability in a specifi c market or institution is trans-
mitted to one or several other markets or institu-
tions [4]. This defi nition is based upon two underly-
ing ideas: there should be a shock, which causes a 
spread of instability, and the transmission of the ini-
tial instability goes beyond what could be expected 
of a normal relationship. An inherent problem in the 
literature dedicated to contagion lies in the diffi culty 
to identify empirically the presence of pure forms of 
contagion.
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The target industry of the current research is the 
banking industry due to its high vulnerability to sys-
temic shocks. In comparison to other industries, con-
tagion in the banking industry occurs faster, spreads 
more broadly within the industry, result in a larger 
number of failures, result in larger losses and spreads 
beyond the banking industry, causing substantial 
damage to the fi nancial system as a whole [7]. Conta-
gion performs a pass-through function for a fi nancial 
shock (Figure 1), and an example of contagion ma-
terialization is a domino effect [8]. The vulnerabil-
ity and magnitude of the consequences of systemic 
shocks is one of the primary reasons for bank regula-
tion in the fi rst place, as the effect of contagion affects 
not only weak fi nancial institutions, but the entire fi -
nancial system. Consequently, it is easier to observe 
the effect of contagion in the banking industry rather 
than elsewhere.
MEASUREMENT AND MODELLING
The reason why contagion remains a problematic 
fi eld of research lies in the nature of the phenomenon. 
Among the factors complicating the measurement of 
fi nancial contagion, are such problems as simultane-
ous equations biases, omitted variable biases, condi-
tional and unconditional heteroscedasticity, nonlin-
earity, non-normality and serial correlation [10].
Regardless of the complexity, the concept of con-
tagion measurement may be approached similar to 
the task of hidden variable modelling [6]. A conta-
gion measurement framework based on a latent factor 
structure allows the study of time and cross-sectional 
dimensions of analysis simultaneously. The latent 
factor framework provides a flexible way to quan-
tify contagion (as it can utilize a wide range of ap-
proaches to contagion measurement, such as correla-
tion analysis, VaR approach, probability models and 
co-exceedance). In our case, an analysis of residuals 
is conducted [9].
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As contagion can be observed only as the effect 
of a latent variable on the model, it is necessary to 
choose a model which will be studied on the subject 
of this relation. Building a regression model, we as-
sume that i term of the model (1) is composed of 
random error and the effect of fi nancial contagion.
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CDSi,t — CDS of a Banki at a time “t”
Z″i,t — Z″ score of a 
,j t
Debt
GDP  — Debt-to-GDP ratio of the Counti
iTraxxt — European CDS liquidity index
VDAXt — Index responsible for volatility
The resultant four-factor regression model (2) is 
expected to explain changes in the CDS spreads of 
banks, which is a proxy of default risk. The fi rst fac-
tor, Z″ — score describes the default probability of 
a bank, based solely on the balance sheet items [3]. 
The second factor signifies government support as 
well as depicts sovereign solvency [5]. The third and 
fourth factors are responsible for volatility and levels 
of CDS market [2]. These factors describe the behav-
iour of CDS spreads, allowing us to focus on the error 
term of the model. If the error term of different banks 
correlates, we suppose that this indicates the presence 
of contagion.
While contagion is a time varying effect, measur-
ing the mean effect may be not appropriate [12], so 
a more advance method is required. It follows that 
Figure 1. Model of systemic risk
Source: [11].
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analysis should focus not only on the panel data, but 
also on the structural relations of factors.
CONDITIONS OF THE MODEL
In order to compose a sample, a quartile panel 
data for 40 banks was collected. Eurozone countries 
were taken to avoid currency exchange bias, and only 
banks issuing CDS were included, due to the condi-
tions of the model. Countries within the Eurozone 
were divided into three clusters by the probability of 
the sovereign default risk.
The decision on the time period of observations 
was dictated by the objectives of the research — the 
main recent trigger events of contagion were the re-
covery after the Financial Crisis 2008–2009 and the 
European Debt Crisis, which started at the end of 
2009. Thus, the first observation is dated Q4 2007 
and the last is Q3 2015; the most recent observation 
available.
EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL 
CONTAGION EFFECT
Individual regression models of banks produce a 
table of residuals. Within each cluster, a coeffi cient 
of the moving correlation is calculated within a 15 
month period, which allows for a matrix of correla-
tion coeffi cients to be produced. In order to fi nd the 
average in the matrixes, values are transformed to 
be normally distributed (3); and after the average is 
found, the value is inversed (4) via Fisher’s inversion 
to the correlation coeffi cient.
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The resultant column of correlation coeffi cients 
describes the average strength of contagion in the 
different clusters. Figure 2 shows the changes in the 
moving correlations.
It is of interest, that relations tend to be tighter 
in the safe cluster, and the weakest correlations are 
observed in the third cluster. During a crisis period 
variables tend to have a stronger positive correla-
tion; however, it can be noticed that the risky clus-
ter had the lowest correlation of the network with a 
downslope trend. This may be explained by the vola-
tility of the fi nancial system in general. While banks 
in Germany, Netherlands and Austria are solvent and 
respond to fi nancial events in the same fashion, in 
risky countries, banks are at different levels of sta-
bility, which make them respond to fi nancial events 
Table 1
As at 23/01/2016 1-Yr Default Probabiliky
Cluster: Country Current High Avg Chg
0 Finland 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.01
1 Estonia 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.03
1 Austria 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.04
1 Netherlands 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.1
1 Germany 0.16 0.44 0.21 0.05
1 Slovakia 0.17 0.48 0.2 0.11
2 Belgium 0.32 0.57 0.32 0.19
2 France 0.44 0.66 0.38 0.29
2 Spain 0.45 0.92 0.42 0.41
3 Ireland 0.61 10.04 1.78 0.6
3 Italy 1.86 2.42 1.46 1.32
3 Portugal 1.87 3.15 1.61 1.69
4 Greece 32.71 36.46 17.98 32.06
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in different ways. This may signify a lower level of 
interbank contagion.
The correlation analysis (Figure 3) may be more 
appropriate to study contagion, as it is free of the 
time-varying bias [12]. In frames of the current re-
search, the main limitation at this stage is a small 
sample which may cause inconsistencies in observa-
tions. It is important to focus on changes in corre-
lation coeffi cients of the three main variables; CDS, 
Z″ — score and Debt-to-GDP ratio during European 
Debt Crisis. In order to test, whether the observed 
values are statistically signifi cant or not, a Student’s 
T-test is conducted for each case.
If two approaches of analysis are combined, it can 
be concluded that, a country’s default risk does affect 
the contagion of banks in the economy, operating in 
two different dimensions: interbank and sovereign-
bank levels. This may be due to the active government 
support of the banking sector during the European 
Debt crisis. An increase in the volume of liabilities be-
tween the government and banks has negatively affect-
ed sovereign-bank fi nancial contagion. Another reason 
may lie in the fact that banks have withstood the crisis 
differently, and thus, were weakened unevenly. Conse-
quently, in cluster 1 banks were relatively unaffected 
by the crisis, and their position remained sound; while 
in cluster 3 banks were damaged to various extents. 
A banking system, in which banks are already weak-
ened to different extents, exhibits a lower interbank 
contagion, which may have caused the lower interbank 
correlation.
It can be observed, that in all three clusters the re-
siduals follow the same trend (Figure 4). This may 
imply that the analysed system tended to drift towards 
higher values over time. It can be suggested, that ei-
ther some latent factor affected the system differently 
Figure 2. Moving correlation of the residuals network
Figure 3. Correlation coeffi cients between CDS, Z’’ and Debt-to-GDP
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over time or that new factors started to infl uence the 
model.
Table 2
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Trend 14.73 49.45 77.06
% 100% 336% 523%
Clusters have positive trends, which are more 
than three and fi ve times higher in the second and 
third clusters respectively (Table 2). Thus, it is 
fair to assume that an increase in the contagion ef-
fect could be associated with the sovereign default 
probability.
CONCLUSION
This paper studied changes of the contagion ef-
fect in the Eurozone during the European Debt Cri-
sis. Summarising the discussion above, the following 
consistencies may be derived:
• The European Debt Crisis has increased the 
sovereign-bank contagion risk in the Eurozone. 
It follows that banks are now more dependent 
on sovereign actions than before, implying that 
sovereign exposures will have a higher impact on the 
fi nancial stability of banks in the future.
• A decrease in interbank contagion signifies 
that in times of crises, the fi nancial system becomes 
more resilient to individual defaults. Considering the 
growing sovereign-bank contagion in the Eurozone, 
this is a controversial side-effect.
Consistencies observed in the example of the 
three clusters may be extended to the Russian 
economy’s situation. The developing banking sec-
tor is expected to be highly depended on the ac-
tions of the Central Bank, and the current Russian 
crisis has strengthened this relationship. The Rus-
sian reality may be related to the third cluster of 
the research, as the sovereign stability has direct 
impact on the banking sector. Some factors of bank 
default in Russia differ from ones observed in the 
Eurozone, thus the model constructed in this study 
is not applicable to the Russian banking system. 
Nevertheless, lessons from the Eurozone should be 
taken into account for the purpose of Russian con-
tagion risk measurement.
Globalization has both positive and negative con-
sequences in terms of financial contagion, and the 
challenge for regulators is to fi nd the optimal balance 
of trade-offs most effective in stimulating economic 
growth. The effect of fi nancial contagion, caused by 
the growing interconnectedness of fi nancial institu-
tions, is an inherent part of this challenge.
Figure 4. Average residuals of regression models
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В рамках реализации проекта «Повышение привлекательности европейского высше-
го образования» на основе договора с Ассоциацией академического сотрудничества 
(Бельгия) 14 марта 2016 г. в Финансовом университете прошел первый информаци-
онный семинар «Обучение в Европе: новые возможности».
Представитель Британского Совета в России И.  Попова рассказала собравшимся о 
специфике обучения и стипендиальных программах в Великобритании. Возмож-
ностям обучения в голландских вузах посвятила свое выступление представитель 
нидерландского центра по интернационализации образования Nuffi c Neso в Рос-
сии Е. Агафонова. Подробно об участии в программах студенческой мобильности в 
рамках партнерства с зарубежными университетами рассказала зам. директора Цен-
тра международного сотрудничества Финуниверситета М. Иванникова.
После презентаций выступающие не только ответили на многочисленные вопросы 
студентов об обучении за рубежом, но и поделились личном опытом учебы в зарубеж-
ных университетах. Интерес со стороны студентов к европейским образовательным 
программам свидетельствует об их желании двигаться вперед и пробовать свои силы 
на новом поприще. Надеемся, что этот семинар и последующие встречи помогут сту-
дентам реализовать свои амбициозные планы и потенциал.
«Обучение в Европе: новые возможности»
